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PANEL DISCUSSIONS
ALLIED CHEMICAL, THE KEPONE INCIDENT, AND THE
SETTLEMENTS: TWENTY YEARS LATER*
Panel Participants: The Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr.;
Manning Gasch, Jr.; William B. Cummings; Robert H. Sand;
Robert B. Smith, III
Moderator: Professor W. Wade Berryhill**
* Marc Caden and Sandra Jackson assisted in the editing of these remarks for
publication.
** The Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr. is a Senior United States District
Judge of the Eastern District of Virginia. After a successful law practice in Richmond
of 25 years, he was appointed to the federal bench in 1967. He has had a long and
distinguished record of service to the bar and the Richmond community. He is very
active as an author, teacher and lecturer. Last year he completed a special assign-
ment to Zambia where he assisted the government in creating an independent and
autonomous judiciary system. Judge Merhige has received numerous awards and hon-
ors.
Manning Gasch, Jr. is a Partner at Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia.
Mr. Gasch is a member of the firm's Environmental Team where he specializes in
environmental disaster cases. His specific areas of expertise include risk assessment
methodology and development of water quality standards for toxics and national re-
source damages. Mr. Gasch represented Allied Chemical in the civil suits involving
Kepone. He is also an active lecturer and author, a member of the Nature
Conservancy, and an accomplished fly fisherman.
As the U.S. Attorney from 1975 to 1979, William B. Cummings was charged
with the prosecution of the Kepone cases. Admitted to the Virginia Bar in 1964, he
has been in private practice since 1979. He specializes in criminal law, civil litigation,
business crime law and personal injury law. He is very active as a lecturer and has
served as an adjunct professor of law.
Robert H. Sand is Assistant General Counsel of AlliedSignal Corporation. He is
responsible for the day-to-day direction of the various lawsuits arising out of the
Kepone incident. He is an active author and lecturer publishing numerous articles on
safety and health law and has lectured at several law schools. Prior to joining
AlliedSignal, he practiced with the New York law firm of Kayes, Scholer, Fiermn,
Hays & Handler. He served as corporate counsel for Allied Chemical during the
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Professor Berryhill: Twenty years ago this July the happen-
ings at a small chemical plant in Hopewell, Virginia ushered in
what has since become an incident of national impact and im-
portance. Through the prosecution of criminal cases, the filing of
civil personal injury suits and the closing of the James River to
fishing, the release of the chemical from the Kepone manufactur-
ing process gained national attention.
The purpose of this afternoon's panel was to revisit the issues
with the hindsight of twenty years.
Each of the members of this panel played a very significant
role in the resolution of the Kepone incident. The panel not only
provides unique benefit of the reflections of the Judge charged
with the responsibility of supervising the numerous cases
spawned by the incident, but also the plaintiffs' counsel for
injured persons, corporate defense counsel, counsel for the de-
fense of civil suits and the U.S. Attorney charged with the prose-
cution of the criminal cases.
Judge Merhige: There was a little something special about
Kepone, I must admit. I have forgotten a great deal of it for
reasons which should be fairly obvious. It was many, many
years ago.
Well, let me tell you a little bit about Kepone. Bill
Cummings may be able to correct me on some of the details,
and if he can't, I'm sure Bob Sand can. Prior to August 19th,
1976 there had been an arraignment or a charge against Allied
and a couple of individuals for having permitted refuse into
navigable waters. There were, as I recall, 941 counts, the last
count being a conspiracy count. In the meantime, or about the
same time, we had about fifteen civil suits going. That was
really an exercise in motion practice. It was really great for my
law clerks because everybody had all kinds of motions.
Kepone litigation. Mr. Sand is a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law
School.
Robert B. Smith III has practiced law in the Richmond area since being admit-
ted to the bar in 1968. He served as plaintiffs attorney in several Kepone-related
suits. Mr. Smith is a graduate of the University of North Carolina and the Universi-
ty of Virginia Law School.




I recall one day a lawyer representing a group of allegedly
injured parties from the Kepone, the people who had worked
around Kepone for a company called Life Science.
The men who organized Life Science had worked for Allied
and then moved over. Their sole customer was Allied but they
owned this business, Life Science, and were making this
Kepone. It was their workers who allegedly were terribly in-
jured.
In any event, we had these suits including one or two class
actions. One class action I dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Finally, we were going to trial on a civil case. It might have
been after the criminal conviction, which I'll get back to in just
a few minutes. All these media people were subpoenaed to
court because they wanted a change of venue and they raised
the devil about having to come to court. Media sometimes think
they're above that sort of thing, but they did come. They want-
ed to know who was going to pay them and kind of silly things.
I denied the motion for a change of venue, but I said I would
reconsider it if something new came up.
We were examining the jury for the first big civil case and I
asked the panel of about forty or fifty if they had any knowl-
edge of the Kepone matter, had they ever read anything about
it, discussed it, anything, ever heard about it. Nobody said a
word. I mean, it was deadly silent. I couldn't believe it. I mean,
that thing was in the papers, TV and everything else. I said,
perhaps you misunderstood my question; let me rephrase it. I
asked the same question that I had just asked. I said, are you
sure you haven't read anything about it? Finally, one man
jumped up. Before I could stop him, he said, "I did and I think
what Allied did was absolutely disgraceful," which, of course,
poisoned my whole panel. So I called counsel to the bench. I
said, "We're going to Elkins." One of them said, "Where is
Elkins?" I said, 'That's why we're going there."
Somehow that case disappeared. It got settled as ninety-two
percent of the cases that come before the court do.
In any event, we went on to the criminal trial. Bill
Cummings would get up every morning, I'm told, at 5:30 and
stretch his muscles and lift weights and do all kinds of terrible
things that he was going to do to Allied, and Allied fooled him
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by pleading nolo contendere. They had fine lawyers: Joe Spivey
with Hunton & Williams was one, and Murray Janus, who had
been in the firm I had left some years before that, was the
other and they plead nolo contendere. The government, as was
their practice, objected to that. It was policy, which I think
they still have incidentally, to fight the acceptance of a nolo
plea, but I saw no valid reason for not taking it.
I explained to the people (who didn't need explanation) it was
a corporation that we had and that it was tantamount to a
guilty plea. In any event, they were found guilty of 940 counts.
Then I got a presentence report, as I was supposed to do. It
turned out that Allied, and I said this from the bench, had
been a pretty good corporate citizen in Virginia. They had done
a lot of good. They were not bad people, but there were a cou-
ple of people there who took short cuts and were throwing all
this dirt like they owned the James River and they poisoned it.
At the same time the state had some kind of a claim against
them.
While I was waiting for the presentence report, other suits
were developing, about fifteen or sixteen of them. We thought
the original group of people who had been allegedly injured
were horribly injured. There were reports that their reproduc-
tive capacity had gone. In any event, the case was settled well
before we realized or got the reports from the doctors that the
injuries were nowhere near as bad as we had first anticipated,
thank God. That was one of the happy things.
The two men that ran the Life Science, as I recall, were
sentenced to serve some time, and fined very substantially. The
fine against Allied was something like $13,400,000. For the first
four hundred and some counts it was $2,500, which was the
maximum, and for the last 450 counts, it was $25,000 which
was also the maximum. This was despite the fact that I had a
good presentence report. I might add that the one who got
away easy was the City of Hopewell, who were a party to the
whole thing. They slipped in right quick and pled quickly and I
put them on probation. Everybody thought that was kind of a
strange thing to put a city on probation, but I did. I guarantee
you, I intended to do something about it if they had violated
the probation, but be that as it may, that never came to pass.
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Then, of course, came the usual motion to reduce the fine.
Somebody told me it was the largest fine that had been im-
posed up until that time for this sort of thing.
I also had suits by fishermen, people who earn their living by
fishing, and they could no longer do that because of the poi-
soned waters. I was being told at these conferences that they
were losing their homes, mortgages and all that sort of thing.
That was really the beginning of the idea of doing something
with this money. I cannot stand here and tell you for sure that
it all just popped out of my head. It might have been Joe
Spivey or somebody else; I don't know. But I did say from the
bench, it's a shame that all this money is going to go up to
Washington and the people who have been hurt the most are
not going to receive the benefit of it. I wish there was some
way that we could help the people of Virginia who were the
ones that had been hurt.
My idea at that time was maybe low interest loans to these
people because I was under the impression that people were
losing their properties and all that sort of thing. That didn't
happen because some of those cases got settled for fairly sub-
stantial sums and they had the monies, I guess, to take care of
that.
We came up with this idea of a trust for the benefit of the
environment in Virginia. That was the theory of it. We honestly
made no cold turkey deal. I suggested that I would certainly
take it into consideration, and I'm not known to double bank
anybody. They knew I would take it into consideration if any-
thing was done.
Allied's lawyers came and said, we will set up a trust for
eight million dollars and we want you to take a look at it first.
I looked at it but I said, no, I've got to have a trustee that rm
sure of because the state had come into it and said, give us the
money. I knew that they had a lawsuit against Allied and I
didn't think it ought to be paid off out of this criminal fine so I
said I wouldn't do that. In any event, we finally worked out a
system.
Mr. Cummings complained about it, as he was supposed to
as I'm sure his people in Washington told him to. He always
did his job, I thought, exceptionally well. He was one of the
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best U.S. Attorneys that we've had during my tenure, and I've
been at it almost twenty-eight years.
In any event, I asked Mr. Cummings if he would get on the
board because under the trust the Senior Judge in the Rich-
mond Division appoints the board of trustees. I asked Mr.
Cummings to get on because I knew he was thoroughly familiar
with the case, and I didn't want any of the funds used to help
Allied buy off their civil liabilities. He accepted. As I recall, I
appointed Judge Henry McKenzie, who was an avid sportsman
and very much interested in our environment; Admiral Ross P.
Bullard, who was the Coast Guard Admiral in charge of the
navigable waters around the Chesapeake Bay and the James
River, so he was thoroughly familiar. Then I was fortunate
enough to get Sydney and Frances Lewis, whose name may be
familiar to you, who knew how to spend money from what I
read in the paper. Then finally a banker. I thought we needed
a banker. George Yowell accepted it. They were a great board.
I remember their first meeting, they brought brown-bagged
sandwiches. They wouldn't spend a dime of the money. I really
had to fuss with them. I said, this is ridiculous; you're not
getting paid. It's silly to bring your own lunch and buy your
own dinner. You ought to have a dinner at least once a year. I
think I finally talked them into that and they now do it.
The board has changed since. Bill just got off voluntarily. He
was president for all these years and just recently got off, much
to my regret. We now have Mrs. Baliles, Jerry Baliles' wife; we
have Mrs. Holton, Governor Holton's wife; we have Mrs. Kluge;
we have Paul Elbling, who is a naturalized citizen very much
interested in the environment; Byron Yost, a banker. He took
George Yowell's place. They've done a tremendous job.
In any event, that's what I know about the Kepone. It
worked out. We've had various people on the board. We've had
Tom Wolfe, the author, who made great contributions. We've
had Cathy Douglas, Justice Douglas' wife, and a number of
other people. The smartest thing the board ever did was the
appointment of Jerry McCarthy, who is here with us today, as
the executive director, and he has done a tremendous job. We
started, I think, with the eight million dollars they have spent
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well over thirteen million dollars and still have sixteen million
dollars. Thank you.
Mr. Gasch: One of the things you think about when you see
this group reassembled is the kind of relationships that were
formed during what was really a very intense period of
everybody's life.
I look down the table here, and I see Bob Sand, who I first
met during the Kepone incident. Robert is with what was then
Allied Chemical, now AlliedSignal. He's been one of my closest
friends throughout that period since then.
I see Judge Merhige. Judge Merhige I met the first time
during that period. Judge Merhige has remained a close friend
throughout the whole period. In fact, I am fond of hearing him
say at social occasions he and I are on a first name basis. He
calls me Chip and I call him Judge Merhige. Some lessons are
hard to forget.
What I would like to do for you is just sketch out a little bit
of a general overview of Kepone, the incident, what happened,
what was behind it, the litigation and so on. I think that may
provide a basis for our discussion a little bit later on. My view
on this might have been a little bit different than Judge
Merhige's in terms of perspective. I think I was about a third
or fourth year associate when I was involved in this process in-
stead of a Federal District Judge. I saw things a little bit dif-
ferently.
Kepone, as a substance, is one of a class of substances called
a chlorinated hydrocarbon. For those 'of you who know a little
bit about science, that's a bad actor. It's a DDT and so on. It
was first synthesized in the 1940s. It was patented by Allied
Chemical as, I think, Compound 1189 if I recall, in the '50s or
'60s.
It's an active ingredient, or was at the time, in such things
as roach bait. It was used for terminating the existence of evil
critters like banana root borers and Colorado potato beetles and
things like that. That was its commercial use. It was first pro-
duced by Deas Chemical. It was then produced by Hooker
Chemical.
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From 1966 until 1974, Allied Chemical manufactured Kepone
in something called the Semi-Works in Hopewell, Virginia. It
was a small pilot plant. Just to give you some idea what kind
of an operation this was, the entire discharge, I computed once
during the litigation, from that facility could have been carried
in a garden hose.
From 1974 until July of '75, Life Science Products manufac-
tured Kepone in what was called a toll processing arrangement
with Allied. That meant Allied bought the raw ingredients, had
them shipped to Life Science Products and then Life Science
Products formulated the Kepone and Allied bought the Kepone
from Life Science Products.
In the spring of 1975 there started being employee problems
at Life Science Products. People started getting sick and the
state health folks got involved.
The discharge was through the municipal system to the City
of Hopewell. The Kepone discharges from Life Science killed all
the bugs in the Hopewell treatment plant and that thing went
down. That sort of blew the whistle on what was going on as
far as the problems with the waste water discharges. The Vir-
ginia Department of Health closed the plant in July of '75, and
the James River essentially was closed shortly after that.
Now, what you have got here is a very interesting period of
regulatory transition. That's why it's interesting academically.
In the 1940s and the 1950s, you're coming through an era of
the miracle chemicals. I remember seeing advertisements on
television when I was growing up, movies about the wonders of
these modem chemicals that scientists had discovered and how
they were going to make this a better world because you could
deal with all these pests. People in underdeveloped countries
who weren't able to raise crops and support themselves would
now be able to. There was great enthusiasm for this kind of
development. Coming in on the later end of this, in about the
1960s, you began to see a kind of a countervailing force develop
which was the awareness of people of the dangers of these
chemicals.
You began to see publications like Silent Spring by Rachel
Carson, things like that. That's the first thing that really trig-
gered that kind of thinking in my mind.
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So here are those two forces really on sort of a collision
course. That's basically what you were dealing with here.
Pre-1970, in terms of regulation what you had was the Pesti-
cide Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, Rodenticide Act,
which required registration and labeling. That was one require-
ment on the use of Kepone. You had the FDA which regulated
tolerance levels in residuals in the food crops that were treated
with Kepone. In Virginia, you had a very imperfect law, the
State Water Control Law, which basically sought to establish
limitations on discharges to streams by dictating what water
quality standards must be. That was a system that never
worked terribly well. So that's coming into 1970.
Coming into 1970 you also had some interesting develop-
ments at the federal level. You had, for instance, the Standard
Oil case decided by the Supreme Court in 1966.' The Supreme
Court decided to get activists in the water discharge field, and I
think they probably did it advisedly knowing that no one else
was doing it. They decided a case which essentially went back
to an old act, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and said that
even if the discharges from a commercial facility do not impede
navigation, those discharges are in violation of the prohibition
against the release of materials into a navigable water body.
That, of course, predictably sent industry into kind of a tail-
spin because that meant that essentially every discharging
industry in the United States was operating illegally and sub-
ject to being shutdown. All of those folks went and talked to
President Nixon, and President Nixon predictably went to the
Corps of Engineers, which was a fairly well-controlled docile
unit, and said, "We've got to do something to neutralize this
terrible threat to American industry. Will you get together a
permit program?" So they developed something called the Re-
fuse Act Permit Program. They were in the business of trying
to issue permits and take applications and things like that.
They were never very good at it, really.
This is all during the time that Kepone is taking place.
1. United States v. Standard Oil, 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
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Then Congress gets into the act, being embarrassed into it
probably by the Supreme Court. In about 1972, they enact the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, an incredibly
complex piece of legislation, which essentially continues today
as the Clean Water Act. This established this very delicate
regulatory scheme for regulating discharges to water, and they
put it under EPA. They didn't put it under the Corps of Engi-
neers. That's the period during which this great period of
change, both in attitude and legal requirements, was going on.
Let me just give you an overview to kind of give you a notion
of where the forest is and what was going on in terms of litiga-
tion. This is a defense lawyer's perspective. It's probably more a
defense lawyer's nightmare.
There were three separate criminal proceedings. The first
was United States versus Allied Chemical Corporation and
certain named Allied employees. There were 940 counts of dis-
charging, in violation of both the Refuse Act and the Clean
Water Act.
As Judge Merhige mentioned, the 941st count was on con-
spiracy. To counts 1 through 940, as Judge Merhige mentioned,
Allied pleaded nolo. They were fined $13.24 million. Count 941
on conspiracy was dismissed.
The second prosecution, United States versus Life Science
Products included Life Science officers of Allied Chemical and
the City of Hopewell. That was for unlawful discharge of
Kepone between '74 and '75, basically the period during which
Life Science Products was operating. Allied was included as an
aider and abettor. Allied was ultimately acquitted. Hopewell
was fined $10,000, I believe. Life Science was fined three mil-
lion dollars and the Life Science officers were fined $25,000
each.
A third criminal prosecution, United States versus Life Sci-
ence, Allied and Life Science officers, was conspiracy. Allied
was acquitted. Life Science was fined $10,000.
On the civil side, there were two suits by the watermen and
fishermen. The first was Adams versus Life Science, Allied, etc.
That was on behalf of named individual watermen plaintiffs
claiming $20 million damages by people who fished in the
James River and related industries. That case was settled.
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Pruitt2 was the class action that survived. There were poten-
tial treble damages in that which made it worth as much as 25
billion dollars, and that was adequate to get Mr. Sand's atten-
tion at the time. It alleged injury to the seafood industry. It
was also settled.
On the personal injury side, the case that Mr. Smith was
involved in, Gilbert versus Allied, Hooker, Life Science, one Life
Science officer,3 alleged harm to Life Science employees. Dam-
ages, I think, ranging up to, depending on how you counted it,
about $108 million. That also was settled.
Collins versus Allied and Hooker alleged harm to Life Science
employees in addition to the Gilbert case. Damages claimed in
that, $54.7 million. That was settled.
There was one property damage suit brought by the Rever-
end Curtis Harris in Hopewell. He contented that the value of
his home was diminished in the sum of $100,000. That was set-
tled.
The Commonwealth of Virginia, sued Allied, Life Science and
Life Science officers for civil penalties for Life Science's unlaw-
ful discharge of Kepone alleging that Life Science and the offi-
cers and Allied were owners under the terminology of the state
water control law at the time. That case was also settled.
That kind of gives you an idea of what we were looking at
and why at the time there was a great deal of angst and ner-
vousness and a lot of meetings and a lot of phone calls and a
lot of relationships and friendships developed that have endured
until this day. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings: It's a pleasure to be with you all here this
afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, to talk about the Chesapeake
Bay. I had the distinct pleasure this past June of swimming
across the Bay with 600 other crazy people up there in Annapo-
lis. That was an interesting experience and delight to be able to
do that despite the fact that twenty years ago we thought the
Bay had been doomed by Kepone.
2. Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981).
3. Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976).
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This is what Kepone looks like anatomically. It's the little
red thing at the top that made it such a bad actor. That's the
carbon molecule as I understand it, I'm not a chemist, with a
double binding. I'm told that's what causes its extraordinarily
long life expectancy something like hundreds of years of life. It
just never, never breaks down. That was the real problem with
Kepone: unlike so many other things, it just would not go
away. The problem we had is that once it got into an animal or
fish it would just stay in the fatty tissue and it just kept repro-
cessing. It would never flush out.
The Bluefish was the worst offender because it was the last
of the chain of fish that most of our population would eat, and
the Bluefish ate all the other little fishes that had been eating
Kepone. So the concentration of Kepone by the time it got into
the Bluefish was apparently just extraordinary which caused
some of the real scares.
This is an interesting historical perspective as we look back.
Twenty years ago this month is when I was sworn in as United
States Attorney and had no idea I'd be confronted with an
incident or disaster such as Kepone. That sort of came to light,
as you heard, in the summer of 1975. We saw it in the newspa-
pers but had not had any referral of the matter to us for crimi-
nal investigation or prosecution.
It was not until about a year later when EPA made a refer-
ral of the case to our office. In a very unusual act, they made a
referral directly to the United States Attorney's Office for our
district as opposed to referring the case to the Justice Depart-
ment which was our normal practice in criminal prosecutions. I
think they were just so concerned, they wanted to get some-
thing going, and they went directly to us.
We assembled a team of prosecutors to work on the case
because of having seen what the papers had generated about
the incident and the disaster with the employees at Life Sci-
ence so we knew it was a big matter. I assigned a fellow from
Alexandria because they didn't have anybody in the Richmond
office that had enough experience that I felt could handle such
a large case. So I got an assistant from Alexandria and one




Together, we assembled a grand jury, some grand jury sub-
poenas and subpoenaed Allied's documents and the Life Science
documents and had to get two rooms in the federal building.
We didn't have space for the volume of materials that were
brought over by the truckloads from Allied Chemical in re-
sponse to the subpoena.
So we poured over the documents for several weeks and saw
the Kepone discharge. It's interesting to note that the 940
counts that eventually became the backbone of the Kepone
indictment and the backbone of the thirteen and a quarter
million dollar fine Judge Merhige imposed were for discharges
of a chemical compound other than Kepone.
Atthis Semi-Works Plant facility that Chip Gasch mentioned,
the main product that they were making there were Theic and
Taic, two compounds that were used for coating of electrical
wires.
The discharge of actual Kepone from there and from these
other products was relatively small, but it had been going on
for years. At the conclusion of each day's operation, as we un-
derstood the situation, they would flush out the equipment. It
would be the discharge of that cleaning out of the pipes that
caused the discharge of the toxic chemicals into the small sub-
sidiary of the James River. The large number of those counts,
the bulk of them, were not Kepone.
The indictment was returned on May 7, 1976. As I recall,
they were sentenced on October 7 of that year. We put on a
whole day presentation to Judge Merhige to show the impact,
the total impact, that we thought that the Kepone and other
toxic discharges that had occurred. We found that the state had
been freezing fish. From time to time they would go out there
and catch a few fish and put them in a deep freeze. They had
been doing this for years and years, and they still do it today
to see if sometime they might want to go back and check for a
compound. Apparently, in order to detect a chemical compound
in something like a fish, they use gas chronography, and it is
very helpful to know what particular chemical compound you're
going to look for. It really saves a lot of money and speeds up
the process.
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They pulled out some fish from 1968, 1969, and 1970, once
they knew about the Kepone discharges. Low and behold, in the
Chesapeake and James River, they detected, now that they
knew what to look for, Kepone contamination. Based upon his
vocal comments at the time, this seemed to get Judge Merhige.
He himself had been, I guess, a consumer of Bluefish. I think
he swore never to eat Bluefish again, as I recall him saying,
because of what he detected to be the horrible consequence
because the Kepone builds up so much in the Bluefish. That
was quite a revelation to all of us.
Of course, what got everybody exercised about Kepone was
what happened at Life Science. The people at Life Science,
Virgil Hundtofte, who had been plant manager at Allied and
William Moore, who had been the director of research for the
division at Allied that made Kepone, really knew better as to
how to run a plant. Allied, apparently, had given them quite an
extensive book about Kepone that explained how to make it
and what safety precautions to take and so forth, and that it
was a toxic chemical. In that book were studies showing that
Kepone had been detected to be a carcinogenic in rats and so
forth. So they had all the information necessary to be careful,
and yet Kepone was found by the regulators lying around in
the facility.
They had a small gas station; you know, about the size of
gas stations twenty years ago. That was the office. They had
these tanks and vats out back that they pumped the stuff
through and eventually made the product. They had Kepone
that would be on the tables or the desk about four or five inch-
es high. It was on the floor.
The workers would come into the office to eat lunch and they
would be sitting at the table and have their sandwich laying on
the same table with Kepone that thick. What really caused the
problem was that they occasionally would have a bad batch of
Kepone at Life Science and they just took the hose from the
batch and put it right into the sanitary sewer there and pulled
the plug and thousands and thousands of pounds of Kepone
would hit the system at one time. As Chip mentioned, it sort of
destroyed the treatment plant. It killed it. It was that kind of a
shock effect that caused people to sit up and realize that some-
thing may be going on over at this facility.
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A young doctor, whose name I don't recall, was the one who
sent a blood sample from an injured or an affected worker that
he couldn't quite figure out what was going on. He was display-
ing some of the symptoms you've heard about, dizziness and
shaky hands and so forth. People looked like they had small
seizures and they couldn't explain it.
He sent the blood sample down to the Center for Disease
Control in Atlanta and got the first confirmation that this per-
son was suffering from Kepone poisoning which prompted Dr.
Jackson to come in and shut the plant down. That was in July
of '75.
Fortunately, I suppose, we did have a shock effect from it.
It's kind of like we were talking about this morning, do you
have to wait for another Kepone before the regulators will real-
ize that something like this is going on? We were frustrated
that Life Science, the one who had caused the damage in the
great magnitude, was a defunct company by that time. It was
shutdown. It was bankrupt. They had only the single product
that they were working on. We were trying to find deeper pock-
ets to try and make more of an impact, and so we went looking
for Allied Chemical.
As we went through the grand jury documents, we discovered
an internal memo authored by Mr. Hundtofte, that really got us
upset, because he recognized in this memo that the Corps of
Engineers' regulations required them to report any discharge of
a toxic substance. It turned out that Mr. Hundtofte decided
that, "Gosh, if I report that substance, I'm liable then to have
to build some kind of screening process to pretreat this stuff
and that's going to cost a lot of money and I'm on the career
ladder of success here at Allied and that's not going to look
good on my resume that I released this information that caused
a three-quarters of a million dollar pretreatment facility. In
about another year or so, Hopewell is going to build a regional
waste water treatment plant, and if we just sort of keep quiet
and so forth nobody will know about it, and we'll just be able
to get by," and they did. Nobody did know about it.
There were memos back and forth saying, "Well, the thing to
do is to do nothing." They wrote this in a memo. The way to
respond to the regulations is to do nothing. So we thought we
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had the smoking gun. We called it "the do nothing memo." We
indicted the people who were in the meeting where that memo
was discussed, circulated and the by-product of the meeting.
There were four of them altogether, as I recall, and two of
them pled guilty. Two of them went to trial.
Those two were acquitted. We felt badly that two had pled
guilty and two were acquitted with a trial. So the Justice De-
partment authorized us, in an unusual situation I think, to
dismiss the counts against the two who had not yet been sen-
tenced but had pled guilty. None of them ended up with convic-
tions.
Hundtofte and Moore were convicted. Hundtofte pled guilty.
Moore went to trial. They were fined, as I recall, $25,000. I
don't think there was any jail term for either one of them.
It was a major event when Judge Merhige announced the
fine would be the maximum allowed on all the 940 counts that
Allied had pled nolo contendere. It was a shock, I think, to
everybody and brought a real awareness, because we saw mag-
azine articles in business magazines thereafter that other com-
panies were now finally taking notice. They were saying people
can get in trouble if you don't pay attention to the regulations.
That's the message he wanted to go out and I think it did go
out.
As he mentioned, Judge Merhige did make it known that he
was quite upset that all this money would go to the federal
treasury. That's where the federal fines go. In fact, as I recall,
he even wrote to the Judicial Center on his own to see if there
was any way that a fine, once deposited to the treasury, could
come back and be used somewhere else and he was told "No. If
the money comes in, it doesn't go out." He didn't require Allied
to pay the fine right away. He had the option of doing that.
At that time the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allowed
a defendant who had been sentenced to file a motion any time
within four months subsequent to the sentence to have the
sentence amended, usually to be reduced. Only the government
can file such a motion now. At that time that procedure was
available, and I think the comments of the Judge were quite
clear to Allied's counsel. If there is any way we can gain some-
thing from this from a public relations standpoint or help the
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State of Virginia, we may get some benefit from it. So they set
about developing plans for the environmental trust which was
named The Virginia Environmental Endowment and came back
three or four months later, the actual day was February 1,
1977, and announced that they had formed the endowment.
They came in with a check for eight million dollars payable to
The Virginia Environmental Endowment, and I guess they had
a blank check in their back pocket because they didn't know
what the fine was going to be. Judge Merhige then reduced the
fine by about that amount of money.
So they wrote a check out for five million and some dollars.
That itself was some multiple more than any environmental
fine had ever been. The thirteen million was by six or seven
times bigger as I recall. The five million dollar fine was three
or four times. It was quite an impact at the time.
As Judge Merhige mentioned, we formed the endowment. Our
first order of business was to tell the Attorney General of Vir-ginia that he couldn't have the money, as I recall. Our first
order of business was to follow the Judge's advice and say "No,
the money really is not going to go to do that, because the
government of Virginia has a responsibility to its own citizens
to use its own resources." This money was designed to help the
citizens of Virginia, in a way that government could not,
through its own restrictions and limitations. We decided that
was going to be our guiding principle, to use the money in a
way that could not be used by government and tell the state
that they had to cleanup the James with their own resources,
which was a big move for us.
Then the next order of business was to hire Jerry McCarthy.
And I'm pleased to say, as Judge Merhige says, that endow-
ment is alive and well and I think doing a great job and it is
one of the sponsors of this program. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sand: I feel a little bit like the proverbial blind men
holding onto different parts of the elephant. I think one reason
is that when you're involved with a news story, you suddenly
discover that the press is terribly inaccurate in your case. In
fact, the problem is a little bit broader than just your case.
Let me change gears a little bit for the rest of us lawyers
and talk a little bit about the media coverage, the impact that
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had on the company's operations and a little bit about how the
succeeding corporation, AlliedSignal, does business today and
how it has changed.
You may have the impression now and then that the incident
was something between Bhopal, with thousands of dead bodies,
and Exxon Valdez, with millions of fish bellied up and dying.
That was, and is, the impression. In fact, this was a small
pesticide business. Ninety-nine percent went over to Germany
where a plant was going to be built by the customer. It was
made in a batch operation a couple times a month. It was not
one of the world's biggest products for the company, nor were
its profits enough to show up on an annual report.
But the media event was enormous then and now. I recall a
phone call, very vivid in my recollection saying, "Hi, Bob. Paul
Lowenwater here. I'm a producer for CBS 60 Minutes. We've
been down here for a day or two and, gee, Life Science really
was an independent company. They chose to ignore your in-
structions and warning labels. What's more, no one is that sick.
Gosh, we don't take it very seriously. Do you guys take it seri-
ously?" I replied, "I am shocked to hear CBS say it doesn't take
this tragedy seriously. God knows, we at Allied do." He said,
and I'll clean up his language, "Ah shit, I don't want a lawyer,
I want someone in public relations."
Interestingly, I gathered from other counsel, that CBS had at
that time called Bill Moore, the former Allied executive who
faced simply being laid off when we got out of the pesticide
business and would not relocate, who said, "Gee, we know
about this interim product, we'll make it for a while." He got a
phone call from the same producer, I gather, and was told,
"Gee, you need help because the big guys like Allied and the
state and the feds are going to try and blame you. You were
really misled by this company." He said apparently, "Gee, I
guess my lawyer was wrong; come on over."
A short time later he was having a can of beer with Dan
Rather, going through the presentation and was much cheered
because, apparently, his side of the story would get out. Rather,
who is a lawyer by the way, said, "Let me put my jacket and
tie on and we'll do a take."
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It really was important to us that Mr. Moore look credible.
He was, even then, making six figures after we let him go as a
scientist. We really had relied upon him to make this product.
If he looked like a light-weight, we obviously had chosen to rely
upon the wrong person.
I was watching the eventual TV show which had the normal
statement, that AlliedSignal had refused to participate in this
show, but Bill Moore had. The camera pans in on Mr. Moore
with Dan Rather. Moore, with a very confident, relaxed smile
looking at his beer-drinking buddy, Dan Rather, and Rather
says to the camera, "Mr. Moore, how do you explain your hav-
ing chosen to ignore all these detailed instructions from Allied
Chemical?" Whereupon, Mr. Moore looked foolish and we were
both in trouble.
In terms of the impact of the press aside from the television,
it was impossible to turn on a TV set or pick up a paper here
or Washington or New York and not read that day's lead story
about these "horrible" activities. Perhaps especially because
Allied Chemical felt it was a leading good citizen, we were
unprepared to cope with this type of problem.
We were used to people like Dow being blamed for Napalm.
But our then chairman had resigned from the cabinet of
Lyndon Johnson, and was in fact the first business executive to
come out against the war in Vietnam. Good guys like us
shouldn't have problems.
One result was, and it can happen to you, getting phone calls
from senior management saying, "Show them the label." The
label we had said, "Danger. May be fatal. Do not inhale."
The press saw the label. But coverage saying "Allied Chemi-
cal did something right," doesn't happen. Reporters want to win
Pulitzer Prizes. Certainly press coverage affects the judiciary,
we all were very aware of the public pressures and the press
pressures.
Allied Chemical found itself a corporation whose top manage-
ment, including the board, was not worrying about business,
but was second guessing lawyers.
The total cost of the Kepone affair is probably in the. low
eight figures. The real cost was far greater than that. Allied
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had been an old line chemical company and had recognized
times were changing; that they needed to get out of certain
businesses, certain commodity chemicals, and get into where we
are now. Our chemicals now make the panels in your comput-
ers, the carpeting on your floor, the high-tech fiber in your car
tire, the laminae boards in your computer. The old bulk chemi-
cals, our fertilizer was the same as their fertilizer, not much
intellectual value added.
The board could not address those problems. They were too
busy watching the press coverage. A corporation can be not just
impacted by the direct dollar cost. A case of this size, accompa-
nied by a shareholder derivative action suing the board mem-
bers personally for neglect of duty, is a serious distraction. In
Virginia we had many thousands of employees working on fi-
bers who had nothing to do with the shut-down agricultural
business, who spent much of their time being disillusioned with
their own employer. You don't like working for a company
that's being criticized.
My mother, for one, was very upset. I spent part of my time
defending my corporation to my mother. You can laugh, but it
was not a laughing matter.
Eventually we did form a small fairly responsible group to
manage the litigation, to settle the cases as rapidly as possible
so we could go back about our business, almost regardless of
what we felt the cases were really worth, and spent less time
worrying about what had actually happened.
I do remember in court, to correct part of the record, man-
agement had convinced themselves locally that it was going to
get out of the production of Kepone. There was no requirement
in those days of limiting what you emitted. The requirement
simply was that you file for a permit and in a couple of years
you would get a permit. Then sometimes thereafter they'd
squeeze down how much you were emitting from your plant.
Plant management had convinced itself they could practice law
and concluded that they need not file for a permit, reasoning "If
we file for this permit, by the time we get it, we'll be out of the
business so why should we waste everybody's time and money."
I do remember the Judge turning at one point to the Coast
Guard official in charge of the permits in those days saying,
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"What would have happened had they listed Kepone on the dis-
charge permit application?" The answer was, "they would have
gotten the permit." That wouldn't happen today, but this was a
long time ago and conduct which we today find deeply repre-
hensible and indeed clearly criminal was not the case twenty
some odd years ago.
Looking at what we do today, I remember one of the first
calls I got was from a major chemical company. The first ques-
tion was, "Bob, I know you're busy; what's the lesson learned?"
Lesson number one is: Toll processing is a normal business. If
you're going to toll process the manufacture of milk to the
Johnson & Johnson Company, don't worry about it. If you're
going to toll process a chemical which is toxic, either give it to
a big responsible company, or if you use a small company,
watch them like a hawk.
One thing we do right now is we audit where we are in-
volved in subcontracting. We review their own capabilities for
legal compliance, employee protection, what they do, and how
they do it. In addition, we have each business area conduct
audits of its own practices at the plant level, at the business
sector level, and just in case there is anything suspicious, the
corporate office has a committee reporting to the board which
has full-time auditors and an outside consultant who audits
plants for environmental safety and health compliance.
I think the biggest change has been in the type of person
we're hiring and the positions they're being hired for. Twenty or
twenty-five years ago, there were very few industrial hygienists,
toxicologists, labeling people. We now have them built into the
organization, and if they're going to be manufacturing a product
or developing a new product, these people are involved from
day one.
Hopefully whatever it was that did happen twenty years ago,
a leak at AlliedSignal Corporation would not happen again; at
least I, if not the other side's counsel, hope so. Thank you.
Mr. Smith: I can speak quickly. Twenty years passes in the
wink of an eye. It's good to see the people that you may not see
in twenty years. I saw Bob Sand twenty years ago when I de-
posed him in Morristown, New Jersey. I remember Chip Gasch
twenty years ago reading from a little black book before Judge
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Merhige. I remember Judge Merhige very well, because I saw
him, generally I thought on a daily basis although it might
have been weekly. I remember Bill Cummings coming out of
the Judge's chambers the day that Judge Merhige levied his
historic fine.
Bill came out. He didn't look happy. His head was down.
Murray Janus, the Judge's ex law partner, came out about
fifteen minutes later. There were certain ambiences within the
courtroom as to what had transpired until the Judge made his
statement and levied his fine. I asked Bill about that today,
and he said he thought that Murray stayed in the Judge's
chambers because he was in shock. I suppose that's what hap-
pened.
What I would like to do is give you a little bit of a back-
ground from a little guy's point of view, a civil point of view,
and more particularly a personal injury point of view.
In the spring of 1975, I was a member of a small five-man
law firm located in downtown Richmond. Ed Taylor, as lead
counsel, and I as his assistant, tried the Kepone case for a
period of nearly eighteen months. We virtually gave up our
other practice. We lived in constant fear of being in bankruptcy,
and our other three partners were sure we were going to be in
bankruptcy.
We came over to this school. We researched a multiple count
complaint against Allied and filed it. Then we requested the
production of documents. You have heard Bill tell you about
what the U. S. Attorney got. I think if we got anything, we got
pretty well a railroad boxcar full of documents. It took two of
us at least a month and a half to two months, going eighteen
hours a day, to read and categorize the documents.
The files have long since gone, but I do remember some docu-
ments that come to mind that perhaps I shouldn't remember. I
do know that one document that was intriguing to us was that
Allied had contracted or was thinking about contracting with a
group in Europe to produce Kepone. In lieu of that, they con-
tracted with Life Sciences, which I always thought was some-
what of a misnomer, to produce it here. The reason they did
was economic. Life Science could produce the product cheaper
even with the cost of transportation to Europe.
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At any rate, we proceeded to go through these documents
and what we were really looking for was a seminal document
that tied Allied to the knowledge of what Kepone was. We
found that document in something called the Larson Toxilogical
Studies.
Professor Larson was a pharmacologist, of all places, at MCV,
the same place that treated the victims of the Kepone disaster.
His studies revealed that not only was Kepone deadly and it
had an enormous half life that's been described to you by Bill,
but it was also a suspected carcinogen.
As time passed, we took depositions. Our intent in taking the
depositions was not so much to discover, we had the documents,
but we wanted to prove our case. The pivotal depositions were
taken in Morristown in 1976. What we wanted to show was
that Allied knew of the problems in Hopewell in the spring and
the early summer months of 1975. We also wanted to show the
necessary nexus between Morristown and Hopewell; that
Hopewell was aware of how toxic Kepone was.
We took our depositions for a week. We were content. We
were encouraged with the testimony given by the Allied employ-
ees. I must say that I was not encouraged by the testimony
given by Mr. Sand, who I deposed. It turned out well. We came
back to Richmond. Upon coming back to Richmond we were
supplied another document. The document was basically a docu-
ment from environmental health to the board of directors of
Allied dated some time in the early summer months of 1975
essentially saying, "We have a satellite in the Richmond area
that is having difficulties. People are sick. What should we do?"
Back came a response from the board of directors, "continue
production." With that we took that document to Judge Merhige
and our case had a speedy conclusion.
We, as the plaintiffs' attorney, of course, couldn't do anything
with the press, but we were surprised that the press, particu-
larly in this area, was so late in coming on board. We couldn't
understand why stories were not coming out of the Washington
Post about this as they were with the Washington Star. The re-
porter who reported from the Washington Star obtained a Pulit-
zer. I, too, got to meet Mr. Lowenwater. I tried to take him to
dinner as often as I could. Essentially what Mr. Sand said
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about what happened to Bill Moore and Virgil Hundtofte is
right on.
One thing I did learn about the press is that if they want
the story to go in a certain direction, it will go in that direc-
tion. Fortunately for the plaintiffs in this case, the press was
sympathetic.
Looking back, and I think what we heard today from Mr.
Kostmayer about how people should be interested in their own
locales, is what settled this case. There was the individual who
caught the fish who testified at the criminal trial and was
cross-examined by Mr. Janus. The cross-examination went to
the point, "Did you catch the fish?" The answer was, "Yes, I
caught the fish." 'Well, how did you know they were dead?"
"Because they were floating around the boat." 'What did you do
with them?" "I put them into my cooler." "What did you do with
the contents of your cooler?" "That's none of your business."
"Once you put the fish in, what did you do?" "I took them back
to my locker." "What happened thereafter?" What Murray was
trying to show was that the chain of evidence had been broken.
Unfortunately, this individual was the same toxicologist for the
state who later tested the fish and had kept the fish all these
years.
There was Dr. Jackson. Dr. Jackson, while he closed down
Life Science rather quickly, received adverse pressure from
those within government. He was, in my opinion, a courageous
individual. It's curious that not only was Life Science closed
down because Dr. Chow's report came back, but also the neigh-
bors were complaining about a white powder coming out of
these double bay garage doors of the Life Science building. It
literally was in a two-bay garage right on Route 10 as you
passed Broyhill Ford. Backing up to Life Science was a railroad
track.
Hexachlorocyclopentadiene was brought in on the railroad
track, HCL, which is the main ingredient of Kepone. And, of
course, on the other side of the railroad track was Allied. These
two operations were extremely close.
As you know, the sole product of Life Science was Kepone.
Kepone was made in its pure form in Hopewell. It could only
be used and marketed in this country in less than one degree
516
THE KEPONE INCIDENT
or one percentage point of purity. In Europe it was used in its
pure form, at least according to my remembrances, on such
things as the Hungarian potato bore and other various insects.
The interplay with the Medical College of Virginia to the
plaintiffs' attorneys were important. For some reason we
latched on to the Department of Neurology to begin with and
stayed away from the Department of Internal Medicine. We had
heard that Allied had made a grant to the Department of Inter-
nal Medicine and we were somewhat concerned about our rela-
tionship with them. If there is anything about this case, at
least for 18 months I knew the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. If I did not learn them by reading them, I learned them
because Judge Merhige made sure we all knew them.
Hunton & Williams, who were defense counsel, wanted to
have independent medical exams, which, of course, they can do
under the rules, of our clients at Duke University. They wanted
to perform testicular biopsies, brain biopsies, liver biopsies, and
kidney biopsies.
Some of the men in the group were somewhat opposed to
some of those tests. Accordingly, Ed Taylor and I, on a Sunday,
made a motion to stop the independent medical exam. We real-
ly had no evidence. We were begging Judge Merhige not to
send these people on busses down to Durham, North Carolina.
About this time was nobody in the courtroom except the
Judge, his clerk, the marshals and the lawyers. About halfway
through the proceeding in came from the side door this fellow,
long beard in a running suit. It was Dr. Philip Guzelian from
the Department of Internal Medicine. I thought, "Oh my good-
ness, he is here to testify for the defendants, and it's a good
move by them."
He came up to our table and said, "Can I testify?" We said,
"sure," not knowing that we could actually say no to him. He
told Judge Merhige in essence if these people are tested under
the methodology in Durham, it won't be the practice of medi-
cine, it will be the malpractice of medicine. As a result of that
testimony, the independent medical exams, at least those par-
ticular biopsies, were never conducted.
You heard some comments about how badly these folks were
hurt. I would like to address that to a degree. Dale Gilbert,
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who the chief case was named after, in the summer of 1976
was in the Medical College of Virginia. He was photographed
and his eyes were wide open. He was medicated with absolutely
nothing. His eyes were wide open and they were like ping-pong
balls going from one side to the other. Both eyes were fast
ping-pong games.
What I would like to say in closing is this: People do make a
difference. In this instance we, as the plaintiffs' lawyers,
brought a case. To us it was an epic case. It lasted a long time.
It was emotionally gut-wrenching. It turned out financially
rewarding to some of us; to some it did not.
For the lawyers on the other side, I'm sure that they would
say the same thing. For those people who did their jobs, and
really I'm talking about Judge Merhige, it changed the way
that things are done in this state. His fine, while it appeared
initially to be of a punitive nature, sent out a message to the
rest of industry, what could be tolerated and what the new
standards were. Thank you.
The panel then addressed questions from the audience.
Question: The Virginia General Assembly recently passed a
voluntary environmental audit bill that allows companies to
privately assess their operations, and the results of that audit
may be privileged. Several members of this audience want to
know, given the "do nothing memos" that Bill Cummings de-
scribed, couldn't Allied claim the privilege if it had discovered
problems as a result of an environmental audit, and if such a
privilege and immunity bill similar to that in Virginia were
applicable in federal cases, couldn't the law have crippled or
severely hampered discovery and enforcement?
Mr. Sand: If you're going to produce the type of memos
which have been alluded to, which have the characterization I
don't happen to agree with, the document speaks for itself, that
was not part of the audit process. That document would be
produced now, as it was then, despite the proposed law. If
you're going to have corporations trying to prove their perfor-
mance, to find those smoking memos while they're still smok-
ing, you might well want to encourage auditing.
It has been my personal position when clients have asked us
questions that, despite what happens in Washington, you ought
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to assume that any memo you write, including a lawyer's
memo, will appear on television the following morning. That
tends to be, I think, the better corporate advice and the best
legal advice.
Mr. Gasch: It's a policy question, basically. You're providing
an inducement to corporations to go in and try to uncover activ-
ities that may result in noncompliance and do something about
them. You can argue this thing both ways. You can say if you
had such a provision in the law at the time of Kepone, you
couldn't have had this prosecution or you can argue that per-
haps it would have resulted in uncovering the practices that
resulted in the prosecution so the problem wouldn't have oc-
curred. It's a balance.
Mr. Sand: In the civil rights area, the courts have sua spon-
te, recognized that civil rights internal audits which are re-
quired by law are privileged.
Question: With back sliding by the federal and state govern-
ment on environmental laws and regulations, are environmental
catastrophes like Kepone more likely to occur than they were
20 years ago?
Mr. Gasch: No. I think that's a lay-down. It is virtually in-
conceivable to me that a Kepone would occur today. There is
too much awareness.
Judge Merhige: Let me answer a question that hasn't been
asked.
With all due respect, I'm not sure that what I did was the
right thing. It turned out in this instance to be the right thing
because we were lucky. But what you have to weigh against
that, and I've given it considerable thought since then, it just
never occurred to me that anybody would think that they could
buy part of the judgment.
I'm a runner, not a jogger. I do things, sometimes they're
right, and unfortunately sometimes they're wrong. Since then I
have never had an environmental case in which I suggested if
somebody would make a contribution that would make a differ-
ence. That's a dangerous thing for the system. I'm not sure that
if somebody were to come to me and say "Look, we want to
make a contribution to the environment," without any conversa-
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tion about taking that into consideration to reduce the fine or
something, I'd throw them out of the office; but, if they just
made it, and the probation officer told me this is what they've
done, it seems to me that would be a different situation, and I
wouldn't be as concerned because that would be indicative of
somebody who had seen the errors of their ways and was trying
to make up for it.
I don't want any of you to go away thinking I'm unhappy
about this one. This one turned out to be exceptional. It turned
out that way because, one, we were dealing with a good cor-
poration. I was dealing with lawyers that knew that all the
money in the world couldn't have bought me or my opinion. I
was primarily concerned with the people who had been hurt.
I'm not ready to go around advocating that ought to be done in
every instance. It worries the hell out of me, if you want to
know the truth, that some of my fellow Judges have said, "Gee,
that's a great idea." I think the environmental trust has re-
ceived money, but it's come primarily, I think, through the U.
S. Attorneys who have made plea bargains of some sort.
Mr. Cummings: I have a response different than Chip's about
could this happen again. I certainly believe that large corpora-
tions like Allied have good quality in-house counsel or good
outside counsel that would advise them of the risks and so
forth. I don't suspect that would be done intentionally by large
corporations. But I'm constantly amazed by the ability of hu-
mans to rationalize. I do see the possibility of people like Mr.
Hundtofte again rationalizing his actions. There was no proof
that we could determine that upper management supported or
approved Mr. Hundtofte, and I meant to mention that in my
opening remarks. But I do see the ability of people like that to
make mistakes, protect themselves, worry about their own job
security, what have you, fail to make reports, not necessarily
have the benefit and advice of Chip Gasch or somebody like
that from a good firm that knows what's going on and go unde-
tected for a while and then cause a problem later on that com-
pounds. I do see that possibility.
I think twenty years ago with the impact of Kepone there
was a lot of publicity and a lot of people took heart to it. I am
concerned as disasters like that fade into history and so forth,
people may not be quite so aware.
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